Confidential Collection No. 45/32-38

1937-38
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Subject: Opinions received from certain persons regarding the appointment of a Non-official member to the Legislative Council.

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Collection No. 1907.37-38

Year 1937—1938

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CS 92-37—1

SUBJECT .... Opinions Recd from Certain persons regarding the appointment of a Non Official Member to the Executive Council

PREVIOUS REFERENCES.

LATER REFERENCES.

WD 1915—GPB—500—24-2-30

Serial No.

APPOINTMENT OF A NON-OFFICIAL MEMBER OF COUNCIL.

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With reference to the ~~personal~~ directions given to me by the Dewan to ascertain the views of the marginally noted gentlemen on the question of appointing a non-official Member of Council, I interviewed all of them, except Sir P.S.Sivaswami Iyer.

Mr. K.S.Chandrasekhara Iyer gave me a note explaining his views, which is put up herewith. The others communicated to me their views orally and I have noted down the purport of what they said in a separate note enclosed.

Chandrasekhara Iyer.
M.Krishna Rao.
R.Srinivasa Iyengar.
Matthan.
P.S.Sivaswami Iyer.

Submitted to Dewan & members in person. may be filed for the present.
MS 14/6/37

MS 11/6/37

WD 03594—GPB—30,000—13-7-35

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Note by ~~Opinion of~~ Rajadharmapravina Diwan Bahadur Mr. K. S. Chandrasekhara Aiyar.

Democracy in any real sense (choice of ministry, making and working out of policy, accountability to popular vote) is impracticable in an Indian State, however, advanced.

Some measure of popular control and action in the sphere of local and municipal affairs already obtains.

Form of General Administration: A trained and experienced staff of officials (i.e., a permanent bureaucracy) for the regular task of administration, and a small and compact Ministry appointed by and responsible to the Ruler to guide administration and formulate policy.

No responsibility to the people.

Popular opinion is ascertained, and makes itself felt in the R.A. and L.C. Also important measures are published in order to elicit general opinion.

The object of the Council is not to elicit non-official opinion, but to carry on the executive administration from day to day.

Each Minister is in charge of a portfolio with specific departments of the administration.

Technical advice is furnished by experts, who give advice but have no responsibility, unless themselves find a place and tender opinion and advice.

Without materially enlarging the Council, making it costlier, and diluting its executive functions by adding non-executive or advisory functions, it will be difficult to find place for a non-official element.

Communal representation will be inevitable, with the result of making the Council unwieldy, lacking in harmony and responsibility to the Soveriegn, and wanting in definiteness of policy and apt to be dilatory in its methods.

Apart from other considerations, the great practical objection to having non-officials on the Executive Council at the present time is that there are hardly any men of experience, broad mentality, and trained ability available for selection. The case of a popular ministry is altogether different; the responsibility is to popular vote, there is a wider field for choice, the number of ministers is larger, a minister or the whole ministry can be turned out at any time, and so on.

Why dilute the present compact Council by bringing in one or two inexperienced, communal-minded mediocricities? and mix up the separate functions of administration and popular opinion?

Once a non-official is appointed to the Council, an insistent demand will be made for the representation of different communities, either all together or by turns. If the experiment is for any reason unsatisfactory, it will be impracticable to go back. The Government will have been definitely committed to the policy of having non-official representatives.

On the whole, then, unless popular Government is envisaged as a near goal, it is desired to make a step forward to its attainment, it does not seem advisable to accede to the demand, at any rate in present conditions.

(3)

Opinion of Sir M.N.Krishna Rao:

He said he had personally explained his views to the Dewan. In brief, his views are as follows:-

(1) There seems to be neither any need nor occasion for such an appointment being made at present. It would ~~serve~~ not serve the practical purpose ~~of~~ satisfying the public demand for responsible Government and putting off the clamour for further reforms in this direction.

(2) Even if a non-official be directly selected as a Member of Council, he becomes an official as soon as he is appointed to the place and will be responsible to one His Highness in the same way as the other Members. It is possible that there may be occasions when he may feel his official position as above to come in conflict with his sense of loyalty to the interests of the body whose representative he may deem himself to be.

(3) The evils of communal representation will become more accentuated than ever.

(4) There is nothing in our present constitution itself to prevent any man being appointed directly as a Member of Council, if a really capable person with the requisite character and integrity be available who could be expected to efficiently tackle administrative matters in the same way as an experienced officer selected in the ordinary course.

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(5) Even if an appointment be made with the mere idea of placating public sentiment, while any satisfaction that may be afforded will only be of a transitory nature, the step once taken will be irrevokable and will lead to ~~a clamour for further~~ additional demands being made

(6) He feels that his views may be considered in these days to be old-fashioned, but he could not help holding them with due regard to the constitution as at present and to the interests of the high standard of administration that we have built up.

Opinion of Mr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar.

He holds views similar to those of Sir M.N. Krishna Rao.

Even if such an appointment be deemed desirable on grounds of expediency, he feels tha no person possessing all the necessary qualifica tions ~~appears to be~~ is immediately available.

In view of the fact that the assurance of Government is to the effect that the appointment will be made when more propitious circumstances come into existence, he considers that it is not desirable to adopt any premature or hasty decision.

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Opinion of Mr. K. Matthan.

He would first consider whether the appointment of a non-official ~~will~~ means the appointment of the best non-official available, without ~~being influenced by~~ used to any communal considerations.

If a non-Brahmin non-official is intended, the question of a suitable candidate being available would arise. He could not think of any one possessing sufficient experience, character and public esteem - which consideration only should support a selection for an appointment of this character.

[In view of the paucity of suitable men being available among the non-official public, he would suggest - though this would be outside the purview of the present reference - the selection of a few men who may be doing good work in local bodies and institutions, being appointed to intermediary appointments and given opportunities to prove their fitness for higher posts.]

In effect, he arrives at the same conclusion as Sir M.N.Krishna Rao, and Mr. K.R.Srinivasa Iyengar.

Opinion of Rajadharmapravina Diwan Bahadur Mr. K. S. Chandrasekhara Aiyar.

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Without materially enlarging the Council, making it costlier, and diluting its executive functions by adding non-executive or advisory functions, it will be difficult to find place for a non-official element.

Communal representation will be inevitable, with the result of making the Council unwieldy, lacking in harmony and responsibility to the Soveriegn, and wanting in definiteness of policy and apt to be dilatory in its methods.

Apart from other considerations, the great practical objection to having non-officials on the Executive Council at the present time is that there are hardly any men of experience, broad mentality, and trained ability available for selection. The case of a popular ministry is altogether different; the responsibility is to popular vote, there is a wider field for choice, the number of ministers is larger, a minister or the whole ministry can be turned out at any time, and so on.

Why dilute the present compact Council by bringing in one or two inexperienced, communal-minded mediocricities? and mix up the separate functions of administration and popular opinion?

Once a non-official is appointed to the Council, an insistent demand will be made for the representation of different communities, either all together or by turns. If the experiment is for any reason unsatisfactory, it will be impracticable to go back. The Government will have been definitely committed to the policy of having non-official representatives.

On the whole, then, unless popular Government is envisaged as a near goal, it is desired to make a step forward to its attainment, it does not seem advisable to accede to the demand, at any rate in present conditions.

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